Last week I contacted the nuances and the difficulties of the “AUSTOFIAL” programs, Systems cannot be fully separated as keepers or Custodial, and how this creates issues when it is related to different tools in this space. This is not the end of the excessive amount of story in the ordinary conversation as it is related to the Bitcoin methods.
Another great thing, in its difficulty bag and nuances, hypocritical costs.
I set these two main needs of something to be taken as holding myself in the last article:
- The user has non-compliance with their finances, or regimen to recover.
- No other party (or groups) have the power to prevent the user from using their money, or regain its power, or dismiss them without user involvement.
Let’s add another basic necessity:
- The user should be able to charge effectively to control its fees over its finances, should not cost less than financial management or strengthen their ownership.
If a user has invested a certain amount of force for enforcing, but may cost 95% of those funds to use that force, you actually see those investors?
The main problem
This is one of the highest estimates of existing designs available 2, such as lightning, staterchains, ship, etc. Bitcoin has a barrier limit, and whenever the waiting transaction in Mempool is greater than Blockchain dose, fees. We do not have a machine, although some senior blocks may say, so that they can maintain regular use of users. Blockchains are not equal without damaging their proposals for the minimum value.
This leaves no choice but to create off-chain measurements, and until now is the only reliable solution to use the pre-signing transaction. That means if a user really has used those previous signed artists, they must pay the fees.
As a result, the structure, and the number of transactions required for enforcing ownership by deciding factors when it comes to the cost of enforcing the Ooniwe applications. The most complicated script, larger transactions, higher the amount of required transaction, is very expensive to work ownership. All these things eventually add to create an active low value to identify them in these programs.
If it will cost 10,000 satoshis to force on-Chain’s ownership, then the idea of holding less than 10,000 for the system is still economically unreasonable. You will pay more money more than the amount you have your claim. Even 10,000 satoshis is too small to practice, you can want to pay 100% of the value you have to work with ownership?
In order to lose the fact of the fact that it is successful, the protected value must be a specific free cost of cooling it, it is 3-5x. If not, then that number cannot be consolidated by the chains, money will be consumed by a person trying.
But it is not
As Artodial programs, this is introducing a gray area in Adigueous. After considering the third need for holding as self-restraint, the small amount below the funds needed to use on-Chain clearly not suicide, but not. While the right holder can reduce the power of their ownership, whatever group contacts are in a layer 2 protocol can call effectively.
This creates the Mexican type standing when it comes to low prices are protected from what layer of 2s unefited. The responsible owner cannot reduce its Chain ownership, but for any other participating users in the layer 2 cannot inform the steal of the implementation of the balance updates. They can burn the right owner’s money by forceing them to send a chain transaction, but they find nothing themselves for doing so.
This creates dynamic energy when stimulated groups continue to cooperate, these smaller prices can be used and converted to the workshop, but when it fits the smallest price on the price.
Becomes very bad
This problem increases two ways. The first is the fee. Bigger The demand for transactions are designed for a blockspace, increasing Feedees go, making a low quality high quality. This is an inevitable result of the Bitcoin demand increased (as long as that need of Bitcoin is not in certain service limitations).
The second is actually the result of current solutions for the first problem. The higher Feedates find, which is the most expensive in the Wearl 2s finding, need to come by projects that allows many people, allowing cooperation finances to be distributed. This requires a larger, or more transactions, which are usually organized as trees that separates money until they have spread to some users, so that they can distribute certain users.
This means that there will be no fees payable for one purchase, but users need to pay a large amount or net transactions or more of their own identity in non-custody.
Now what do we do?
Identifying the trespass, this can be a negative problem, at least on a security scale of security model that reaches existing ownership while reducing the money financing in the case of the collective case, this is increase Costs (enhanced by anything higher the higher teerate) in a fake case. However, the ability to apply non-hazardous guilty is actually forcing ownership.
From now on, the best we can do to find practical blockspace methods for noncoperatively. This will mean new Opcodes, according to agreements, which will allow one user to withdraw its cash portion from the allocated UTTO.
This can prevent difficulty creating a problem with many who need more transactions and work ownership, but still no problem with the basic problem of arrogance. Even in the best power of the user will still need to do one work to use their own ownership, and the highest stimuli. This is a factor that can be basically.
Whether it is solved, the option, or somewhere in, this is a serious dynamic energy that users understand. It is a gray place when things go wrong, and when things go wrong can lead to the users who have lost their finances.
