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Security lapses, major lapses in Gaza border blockade before October 7 massacre revealed

The N12 investigation found serious security flaws in the Gaza border blockade, revealing flawed warnings, poor design, and budget lapses.

Major security flaws and despair in the design, construction, and operation of the barrier in Gaza on the Hamas border that was breached on October 7 was revealed by N12 on Saturday.

The report highlighted a series of systemic problems, including technical resources, ineffective resources, and gaps in strategic planning that ultimately left southern communities vulnerable.

Launched in 2021, the barrier was added as a major defense project. It was intended to use autonomous, robotic, and advanced surveillance systems to stop infiltration into Gaza.

“The upper fence is very important,” said Brig. – Gen. Eran Ophir, head of border and marriage management in the defense ministry, and project lead. “It is prepared for threats from Gaza. It is strong, it is strong, and it will answer all threats in this area. This is an upper barrier that prevents excessive infiltration.”

However, according to several project officials interviewed by N12, the advanced capabilities described in the public statements were not fully realized. One senior official involved in the project said, “Where is the technology that was promised? They sold dreams to the residents. The border was not smart or deadly.”

Another official added, “There were dolorotots walking around the barrier whenever reporters came. Other than that, they couldn’t do anything. They knew the limit of security.”

Palestinians take control of an Israeli tank after crossing the border fence with Israel from Khanan Yunis in the Southern Gaza Strip, October 7, 2023. (Credit: Abed Rahim Khatib / Flash90)

The Barrier project began after the Gaza conflicts of 2014 revealed extensive networks dragging into Israeli territory. Of the estimated budget of NIS 5 billion, most was used for underground protection, while only NIS 122 million was invested for the above-ground fence, which was eventually broken.

According to the intelligence spokesman Dr. Oner Getman, “We have invested billions in a project that aims to cut channels and secure access to them. What we have missed is the power of global coverage.”

Dr. Yuval Steinitz, who is a member of the Cabinet, also warned of wider threats. “I always said that the biggest danger was not a group or 20 groups coming through the tunnels, but a mass attack of thousands of people who were forced to cross the fence and enter Stort, Kibbutzim and bases.”

Apart from this, the above ground barrier was not developed to deal with such conditions. “They were preparing for the previous war,” said one senior commander in the southern Khuya, referring to the military’s focus on the tunnel since 2014.

Early Warnings Considered

It is reported that the military intelligence has been reported to have received a detailed plan of attack by Hamas in the year 2018. The program known after four years as “Jericho against the wall,” they pointed out that the arenas of thousands of Jericho, “revealed that thousands of residents of Elite Nuhhbha will cross the earth excessively, not through tunnels.

Dr. Danny Tirza, an expert in the Prevention of Defense Evaluation, told N12, “we received these threats, threats of attacks, and the fence that we are building did not respond to them.”

Another senior police officer said, “They told the residents that the fence above the ground would prevent entry, but it wasn’t even designed for that. It only took the attackers 15 minutes.”

Langotsky, a former tunnel warfare consultant, added, “I said, ‘Guys, this is cheating.’ Not that it doesn’t help at all, but the trick is that this is a simple hermetic thing. There is no such thing. Heaven forbid, look at what’s possible. “

Hamas conducted field tests in the weeks before the attack

According to the report, Hamas carried out some operations to inspect the fences in the weeks before October 7, using motorcycles, small bridges and explosives. One important test, carried out a week earlier, involved hitting a structured beam into a barbed wire fence. It was successful. The report says that the operation did not provoke an IDF response.

Langotsky also said that he suggested that he carry out the wishes of the IDF as to how the wall was breached, but he did not know if anything was actually done. “I suggested doing a job on how to break the wall. Let’s bring in someone who will give himself the thought of playing the role of Hamas. I don’t think that’s done.”

Efforts by the Gaza Division administration to develop a defense response have reportedly failed. Proposals to improve weapons systems, such as replacing outdated naval-style machine guns or using a new project called “Imbeze Green,” were rejected due to budget concerns.

The administration also reports a lack of preparedness in the armed forces. Only 14 tanks were manned for this period’s attack, and others were idle due to restrictions aimed at saving operational costs.

Jehuda Cohen, the father of survivors who survived Nimrod Couhen, explained the situation, “there are, near the border that will work in the workplace because the machines that worked with porm.”

It is reported that an additional letter issued five months before the attack called for a significant reduction in the number of kilometers traveled by tanks and apcs, including the Gaza section. Brig. – Gen. Avi Rosenfeld allegedly overstepped the mark and was fired.

Ignite arguments and promotions

UN12 reported an internal disagreement between IDF Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavis and Southern Command Head Herzi Halevi regarding the deployment of new systems. When Halevi asked to be included in the Gaza border, Kochavi ordered to be sent north.

N12 also highlighted the recent promotion of Brig. – Gen. Eran Ophhir has gone to great generality. Former officials questioned this decision, given his role in overseeing the construction of the barrier. One senior official said that Ofir asked Halevi to be promoted based on the harvest, but he was turned down. The current chief of staff Zamir later accepted, with support from Defense Minister Yoav Gallant.

Sabag, a former IDF engineer who investigated the failure of the barrier, concluded, “like the wave line and the bar-lev line, when doing a long and expensive project, it creates overconfidence.”

The Ministry of Defense said, “The barrier disrupted more than 30 tunnels and stopped new construction.

From the front of Found Aviv Kochavie’s staff, and, “During Kochavi’s time, new methods of finding and destroying enemies were introduced. Traditional defenses were also strengthened.”

A spokesman for the IDF, said, “A thorough investigation is being carried out in relation to the concept of Gaza Border Defense. The effort to coordinate the current affected by the current payment. Maj. – Gen. – Gen.

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